Protecting Kids Online Requires More Than Legislation

I’m all for educating kids (and honestly adults) about responsible internet use, digital permanence, online exploitation risks, privacy, and the very real repercussions that can come from online activity. That education is desperately needed, and far too many parents and schools are behind the curve on it.

Heck, call me. I started giving presentations on these issues more than 10 years ago and still happily will. I’m sure I could even enlist some of the best in Trust and Safety to help.

That said, as someone who has spent years working in internet law and platform-related legal issues, I’m not in favor of Arizona HB2991 in its current form.

To be clear, there are parts of the bill that I think come from a reasonable place. I don’t think platforms should be algorithmically promoting pornography or sexually exploitative material to minors through recommendations or targeted content feeds. I also think better parental tools, stronger reporting mechanisms, and safer default settings for minors are worthwhile conversations to have.

But legislation like this often sounds much simpler in theory than it is in practice.

The problem is that laws requiring broad age verification, parental consent systems, and platform monitoring create serious constitutional, privacy, and enforcement concerns. They also create a dangerous tradeoff: to “protect” minors, platforms are often pushed toward collecting even more identifying information from everyone through ID checks, data retention, and surveillance-style infrastructure tied to speech and internet access.

And realistically, technologically savvy minors (and those with the will to) will often bypass these systems anyway, while average users lose privacy in the process.

I also worry about vague or overly broad standards that put platforms in the position of deciding what content is “harmful,” especially when the law intersects with speech rights, education, health information, sexual orientation or gender identity topics, politics, or controversial social issues.

We absolutely should:

  • teach digital literacy earlier
  • educate parents (and grandparents)
  • address predatory conduct aggressively
  • prosecute exploitation crimes
  • encourage healthier online habits

But I believe the better long-term path forward is education, awareness, and closing the digital knowledge gap between generations, parents, educators, policymakers, and the rapidly evolving technology itself.

Good intentions do not automatically make good internet law.

E-Commerce: Pros and Cons of Drop-Shipping

Drop-shipping is a popular business model in e-commerce where a retailer does not hold inventory but instead transfers customer orders and shipment details to a supplier or wholesaler, who then ships the products directly to the customer. While drop-shipping offers several advantages, it also comes with certain challenges. Let’s explore the pros and cons of drop-shipping:

Pros of Drop-shipping:

  1. Low Startup Costs: Drop-shipping eliminates the need to invest in inventory, warehousing, and shipping infrastructure, making it a cost-effective option for entrepreneurs with limited capital.
  2. Wide Product Range: As drop-shippers rely on suppliers with extensive inventories, they can offer a wide range of products without managing physical stock.
  3. Flexibility and Scalability: Drop-shipping allows businesses to test various product lines and adjust their offerings quickly based on customer demand. It also offers scalability without the limitations of managing inventory.
  4. Location Independence: Drop-shipping businesses can be managed from anywhere, as long as there is an internet connection. This allows for greater flexibility in work arrangements.
  5. Reduced Risk: Since the drop-shipper does not pre-purchase products, they are not exposed to the risk of unsold inventory or slow-moving goods.

Cons of Drop-shipping:

  1. Lower Profit Margins: Drop-shipping often involves lower profit margins compared to traditional retail models due to the additional costs involved in paying suppliers and shipping fees.
  2. Inventory and Product Quality Control: Drop-shippers rely on third-party suppliers for inventory, which can lead to challenges in monitoring product quality, availability, and shipping times.
  3. Order Fulfillment Challenges: As drop-shipping involves multiple parties, there is a risk of miscommunication and delays in order fulfillment, potentially leading to customer dissatisfaction.
  4. Branding and Customer Relationships: Drop-shippers have limited control over packaging, branding, and customer experience, which may impact their ability to build a strong brand and lasting customer relationships.
  5. Competitiveness: The low barriers to entry in drop-shipping can lead to increased competition, making it challenging to stand out in a crowded market.
  6. Supplier Reliability: The success of drop-shipping heavily relies on the reliability and efficiency of suppliers. If a supplier fails to deliver on time or experiences stock shortages, it can directly impact the drop-shipper’s business. Depending on your vendor’s terms of service, you may have little recourse for errors to boot.
  7. Profit Margin Compression: As more retailers enter the drop-shipping space, suppliers may increase product prices or charge additional fees, leading to reduced profit margins for the drop-shipper.

In conclusion, drop-shipping offers a flexible and cost-effective way to start an e-commerce business, but it also comes with inherent challenges. Entrepreneurs considering drop-shipping should carefully weigh the pros and cons to determine if this business model aligns with their goals and capabilities. Proper supplier selection, effective communication, and a focus on providing a positive customer experience can help mitigate some of the challenges associated with drop-shipping.

Disclaimer: This information is intended to be general advice and should not be relied upon as formal legal advice. If you are looking for legal advice as to your particular situation, please contact an attorney in your jurisdiction. If you’re located within the state of Arizona, consider contacting Beebe Law, PLLC.

Ninth Circuit says COPPA does not preempt state law claims – Jones v. Google

In this case, a class of children (“Children”), represented by their parents and guardians, filed a lawsuit against Google LLC, YouTube LLC, and several other companies, alleging violations of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). The Children claimed that Google used persistent identifiers (via targeted advertising) to collect data and track their online behavior without their consent, which violated state law and COPPA regulations. More specifically, Children are seeking “damages and injunctive relief, asserting only state law claims: invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment, consumer protection violations, and unfair business practices, arising under the constitutional, statutory, and common law of
California, Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Tennessee. The parties agree that all of the claims allege conduct that would violate COPPA’s requirement that child directed online services give notice and obtain “verifiable parental consent” before collecting persistent identifiers.” Google argued that it wasn’t subject to COPPA because YouTube is a “platform for adults” even though it knows that children use the platform. [Editor’s note: That sure does seem like a stretch of an argument given just how much content directed at children there is on that platform.]

The district court dismissed the case, citing preemption grounds (that is that the state law claims were preempted by COPPA, a federal regulation), but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal in an amended opinion.

The Court first considered whether COPPA preempted state law claims that were based on the same conduct prohibited by COPPA. The court noted that: “[e]xpress preemption is a question of statutory construction. COPPA’s preemption clause provides: ‘[n]o State or local government may impose any liability . . . that is inconsistent with the treatment of those activities or actions under this section.‘ 15 U.S.C. § 6502(d).” (emphasis in original) The court determined that state laws that supplement or require the same as federal law are not inconsistent and do not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objectives. Thus, the court concluded that COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to, or proscribe the same conduct forbidden by, COPPA.

The court also addressed conflict preemption, which occurs when state law conflicts with a federal statute. They found that conflict preemption did not apply in this case because the state law claims did not prevent or frustrate the accomplishment of COPPA’s federal objectives.

As a result, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the case on preemption grounds and remanded it for further consideration of other arguments for dismissal.

Citation: Jones v. Google, LLC, Case No. 21-16281, 9th. Cir. (Jul. 13, 2023)

Disclaimer 1: This summary was initially generated by ChatGPT and then edited to include more specific information by a real human … because, you know, humans are still better than the machine tool.

Disclaimer 2: This is for general information purposes only. This should not be relied upon as formal legal advice. If you have a legal matter that you are concerned with, you should seek out an attorney in your jurisdiction who may be able to advise you of your rights and options.

The Temptation of ChatGPT for Legal Contracts: Why Human Expertise Reigns Supreme

Disclaimer: This article, while reviewed and slightly edited by a real live human prior to publication, was initially drafted by ChatGPT. Even ChatGPT knows its own limitations.

In this digital age, where technology continues to advance at a rapid pace, it’s no surprise that businesses and individuals seek innovative solutions for various tasks, including legal contract creation. With the rise of AI-powered language models like ChatGPT, one might be tempted to rely on them for generating legal contracts quickly and conveniently. However, while ChatGPT and similar tools offer impressive capabilities, there are significant reasons why they fall short when it comes to formal legal contract creation.

Understanding the Temptation

ChatGPT, with its ability to generate coherent and contextually relevant text, can be alluring for those seeking a quick solution for legal contract drafting. The convenience of inputting prompts and receiving instant responses may seem enticing, especially for individuals who are not well-versed in legal language or lack the resources for professional legal assistance. The prospect of saving time and money might make ChatGPT an appealing choice at first glance.

The Limitations of ChatGPT

  1. Lack of Contextual Understanding: While ChatGPT excels in understanding and generating text based on provided prompts, it lacks the ability to truly comprehend the nuances of legal contracts and their specific legal implications. It lacks a deep understanding of legal concepts, precedents, and regulations that are crucial for creating enforceable and comprehensive contracts.
  2. Legal Accuracy and Updates: Legal landscapes are dynamic, with laws, regulations, and court rulings subject to change. ChatGPT’s training data might not encompass the most up-to-date legal information, potentially leading to inaccuracies or outdated clauses in generated contracts. Attorneys stay abreast of legal developments and ensure that contracts align with current laws and regulations.
  3. Tailored and Specific Legal Advice: Legal contracts require a personalized touch to address the unique needs and circumstances of each client. ChatGPT, while proficient in generating text, cannot provide the tailored legal advice and expertise that an attorney can offer. Attorneys can carefully analyze a client’s situation, identify potential risks, and customize contracts accordingly.
  4. Complex Legal Language: Legal contracts often utilize specialized terminology and language that carry precise legal meanings. ChatGPT may not fully grasp the intricate nuances and subtleties of legal language, potentially resulting in ambiguous or poorly drafted provisions that could be exploited or lead to disputes.
  5. Confidentiality and Security: Legal contracts often involve sensitive and confidential information. Sharing such information with a third-party AI model might raise concerns regarding data privacy and security. Working with a trusted attorney ensures the confidentiality and protection of sensitive information.

The Indispensable Role of Human Expertise

While technology can undoubtedly enhance various aspects of our lives, legal contract creation necessitates the expertise, experience, and ethical judgment that only human attorneys can provide. Attorneys possess the legal knowledge, contextual understanding, and analytical skills required to create contracts that mitigate risks, protect client interests, and ensure compliance with applicable laws.

By engaging an attorney for legal contract creation, businesses and individuals can benefit from:

  1. Tailored Advice: Attorneys can assess unique circumstances, identify potential risks, and provide advice tailored to specific needs, ensuring contracts align with individual goals and requirements.
  2. Legal Compliance: Attorneys stay updated on legal changes and ensure that contracts adhere to current laws and regulations, reducing the risk of non-compliance and legal disputes.
  3. Clarity and Precision: Attorneys are skilled in crafting precise and unambiguous contract language, minimizing the potential for misinterpretation and reducing the likelihood of future disagreements.
  4. Risk Mitigation: Attorneys understand the potential risks associated with different types of contracts and can draft provisions that protect clients from liabilities and unforeseen circumstances.
  5. Dispute Resolution: In the unfortunate event of a contract dispute, attorneys provide legal representation and guidance, leveraging their expertise to achieve favorable outcomes through negotiation, mediation, or litigation.

While ChatGPT and similar AI language models have their merits, they cannot replace the indispensable role of human attorneys in the creation of formal legal contracts. The complexities, legal nuances, and individual circumstances involved in contract drafting necessitate the knowledge, experience, and personalized advice that only human legal professionals can provide. By seeking the guidance of an attorney, individuals and businesses can ensure the creation of enforceable, comprehensive, and customized contracts that protect their interests and mitigate legal risks.

[EDITOR NOTE: Look, we get it. Everyone wants a faster way to prepare content. Lawyers are no exception. That said, it’s important to understand the difference between when ChatGPT can be a useful tool, and when it’s best to have a set of trained legal eyes looking at and thinking about something. Legal documents are not the area where you want to cut corners. If you do, there is a good chance that you will be paying a lawyer to deal with a ChatGPT mess up … because, you know, ChatGPT makes up fake law and stuff. Don’t bet the company on ChatGPT … at least not yet.]

DISCLAIMER: This is for general information purposes only. This should not be relied upon as formal legal advice. If you have a legal matter that you are concerned with, you should seek out an attorney in your jurisdiction who may be able to advise you of your rights and options.

SCOTUS declines to rule on Section 230, again. – Gonzalez v. Google

The widely industry watched nail biter of a case, Gonzalez v. Google, has been ruled upon by the Supreme Court of the United States. Many advocates of Section 230 thought for sure that SCOTUS would ruin the application of Section 230 as we know it, however, that didn’t happen. Much to the dismay of many critics of Section 230, SCOTUS (and rightfully so under the facts of this case in my opinion) kicked the can on the issue of Section 230 and declined to address the question.

CASE SUMMARY:

In this case, the parents and brothers of Nohemi Gonzalez, a U.S. citizen killed in the 2015 coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris, sued Google, LLC under 18 U.S.C. §§2333(a) and (d)(2). They alleged that Google was directly and secondarily liable for the attack that killed Gonzalez. The secondary-liability claims were based on the assertion that Google aided and abetted and conspired with ISIS through the use of YouTube, which Google owns and operates.

The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim but allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. However, the plaintiffs chose to appeal without amending the complaint. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of most claims, citing Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, but allowed the claims related to Google’s approval of ISIS videos for advertisements and revenue sharing through YouTube to proceed.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s application of Section 230. However, since the plaintiffs did not challenge the rulings on their revenue-sharing claims, and in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, the Court found that the complaint failed to state a viable claim for relief. The Court acknowledged that the complaint appeared to fail under the standards set by Twitter and the Ninth Circuit’s unchallenged holdings. Therefore, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Twitter. [Author Note: If you listen to the oral argument, you’d see just how weak of a case was brought by Plaintiff].

In summary, the Supreme Court did not address the viability of the plaintiffs’ claims but indicated that the complaint seemed to fail to state a plausible claim for relief, and therefore, declined to address the application of Section 230 in this case. The case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration.

DISCLAIMER & OTHER POINTS:

I’m currently sitting at the Tenth Annual Conference on Governance of Emerging Technology and Science. There is a lot of talk about AI, including ChatGPT. Because the Gonzalez opinion was so incredibly short by comparison, I thought I would test out ChatGPT’s ability to summarize this case. Having followed this case, and read the SCOTUS opinion myself, I was quite surprised with summary that it spit out, which is what you just read above. For those that want to read the case opinion for yourself (it’s only three pages) you can review the SCOTUS opinion linked to below. I’ve also included the link to the Twitter case as well (which is a more typical 38 page opinion). In case you are curious, I also asked ChatGPT to summarize the Twitter case, however, there is some sort of character limit as I received an error message about the request being too long. We’re all learning.

Citation: Gonzalez v. Google, 598 U.S. ___ (May 18, 2023)

Citation: Twitter v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. ___ (May 18, 2023)

DISCLAIMER: This is for general information purposes only. This should not be relied upon as formal legal advice. If you have a legal matter that you are concerned with, you should seek out an attorney in your jurisdiction who may be able to advise you of your rights and options.

Section 230 Protects Users Too – Monge v. Univ. of Pa.

One of the rarely discussed points, in the grand scheme of Section 230 chatter anyway, is the fact that Section 230 not only protects various interactive internet platforms, but it also protects users, just like you and me, on the various Internet platforms from third-party content. For example, if you’re an administrator/moderator of some random Facebook group … generally speaking, Section 230 protects you from legally actionable content that other users post in that group. Just like the interactive Internet platforms, you, as a user of the platform, also get some protections. This is also true, as this case will underscore, if you share an article via email that is alleged to be defamatory. Given the ease and frequency that people like to share information that they don’t necessarily read let alone fact check for themselves, you’d think this would be front and center in more discussions when trying to teach people that Section 230 isn’t all about protecting “big tech”.

To be clear, the fact that Section 230 protects users too isn’t just something determined by the courts through case law, but is something actually spelled out right in the language of the statute itself.

“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis of bold and italics added)

The below information is based upon the information provided in the court opinion. I have no independent knowledge about the facts of this case.

Plaintiff: Janet Monge

Defendant: University of Pennsylvania, Deborah Thomas, et al.

HIGH LEVEL OVERVIEW

A University of Pennsylvania faculty member, Dr. Deborah Thomas, shared an article that allegedly defamed Dr. Monge via a list serve to an organization that Dr. Monge is a member of. Obviously upset about the situation Dr. Monge filed a lawsuit for claims of defamation, defamation by implication, false light, and civil aiding and abetting against defendants, including Dr. Thomas. Dr. Thomas filed a Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted arguing that 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) immunizes her from liability. The court agreed with Dr. Thomas and dismissed the action, with prejudice, i.e., dismissed those claims permanently.

THE LEGAL WEEDS

It is almost funny to say “legal weeds” here because this was an easy Section 230 win. The Court stated “[c]ourts analyzing and applying the CDA have consistently held that distributing, sharing, and forwarding content created and/or developed by a third party is conduct immunized by the CDA” and then goes on to cite six cases supporting this position relating to content that was shared in an internet chat room, via email, and other technologies. The Court similarly dismissed Dr. Monge’s “material contribution” argument, suggesting that Dr. Thomas materially contributed to the alleged defamatory statements by including her own commentary in the email forwarding the articles. The Court’s rationale was that Dr. Thomas “did not add anything new to the articles, or materially modify them, when she shared them via email, so she did not materially contribute to the alleged defamation. The Court again cited to multiple cases supporting this point. Based upon these points, the Court rightfully concluded “Dr. Thomas’s conduct of sharing the allegedly defamatory articles via email is immune from liability under the CDA.”

SUMMARY OF THOUGHTS

As mentioned before, this was an easy Section 230 win. Ironically, this is also one of those instances where you see a Plaintiff upset about the content of something end up making the matter a bigger deal by filing a lawsuit where now you have legal academics talking about the situation which is a prime example of the Streisand effect. I can understand in general why Plaintiffs want to set the record straight when they believe false information has been put out about them. On the other hand, if you’re going to take it to court, it is important to realize that such action often shines a lot of light on an issue that you might rather have just kept to a smaller audience.

Citation: Monge v. Univ. of Pa., Case No. 22-2942 (E.D. Pa. March 10, 2023)

DISCLAIMER: This is for general information purposes only. This should not be relied upon as formal legal advice. If you have a legal matter that you are concerned with, you should seek out an attorney in your jurisdiction who may be able to advise you of your rights and options.

Newsweek’s 12(b)(6) failed in defamation case – Boone v. Newsweek

I have never understood the point of news publications including images in their articles/publications that aren’t actually story or incident related. This is especially true when they are reporting critically about specific individuals. I get it, images help with clicks and drawing attention but that’s what stock photos or massively cropped photos are for. Nevertheless, according to the statements in the Court’s opinion, Newsweek made a decision to do just that which resulted in, without surprise, a defamation and false light case against them.

The below information is based upon the information provided in the court opinion. I have no independent knowledge about the facts of this case.

Plaintiff: James Boone

Defendant: Newsweek, LLC, et al. (related entities)

HIGH LEVEL OVERVIEW

Newsweek, an online news organization, published a story about a a police officer who was accused of racially profiling a man in a restaurant. Rather than posting an image of the officer that was being accused of the profiling, Newsweek chose to embed a photo of a police officer, who was apparently identifiable by partial face, nametag and badge number, that had nothing to do with the headline and story. Allegedly, as a consequence, Boone and his family received texts, emails and messages via social media inquiring about the article under the impression that he was involved resulting in Boone having to seek police protection. Boone’s lawyer wrote to Newsweek alerting them to the issue and asked that “appropriate measures [be taken] to mitigate the harm.” For whatever reason, Newsweek apparently didn’t respond. Consequently, Boone filed a lawsuit against Newsweek for defamation and false light in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Newsweek then filed a motion to dismiss, under Fed.R.Civ.P., Rule 12(b)(6) [failure to state a claim] arguing that Boone failed to plead enough facts to support a reasonable inference that Newsweek acted with “actual malice.”

A LITTLE INTO THE LEGAL WEEDS

In this particular instance, Boone is considered a public-figure. “To prevail on a defamation case, the First Amendment requires that public-figure plaintiffs plead-and later, prove, that the defendant acted with ‘actual malice.'” Contrary to most lay persons belief, and as the court explains “‘[a]ctual malice’ is a term of art that does not connotate ill will or improper motivation” rather it means that the “publisher acted ‘with knowledge that [the allegedly defamatory statement] was a false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” When breaking it down further, the term “reckless disregard” means “that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement or that the defendant had a subjective awareness of probable falsity.”

The “actual malice” standard is a pretty high bar to recovery. It can be even higher when you’re considering, as here, not a direct false statement but when there is alleged defamation by implication. In this instance “[Boone] has to show that [Newsweek] “either intended to communicate the defamatory meaning or knew of the defamatory meaning and was reckless in regard to it.” This inquiry is subjective in nature which requires that “some evidence showing, directly or circumstantially, that the defendants themselves understood the potential defamatory meaning of their statement.” Obviously, false implications are capable of being defamatory.

Here Boone would need to prove that “Newsweek knew the implication that Boone was involved in [the subject incident] or was reckless about that falsity” and that “Newsweek either intended to convey the false impression that Boone was involved in [the subject incident], or knew that publishing the photograph would likely convey the false impression that Boone was involved in [the subject incident] but recklessly published it anyway.” While the Court discusses some other things, the Court here took issue with the fact that Boone’s badge number and name tag were visible in the photograph. The Court stated:

“The fact that the photograph depicted Boone’s nametag and badge number therefore gives rise to a reasonable inference that Newsweek (1) knew that Boone was not involved in the [subject] incident or acted in reckless disregard of that fact, and (2) knew that publishing the photograph would likely convey the false impression that Boone was involved in the [subject] incident but recklessly published it anyway.”

Because there was a “reasonable inference that Newsweek acted with actual malice” the Court denied the motion to dismiss the defamation claim. With respect to the false light claim, which also requires the finding of actual malice, the Court similarly denied the motion to dismiss.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Defamation litigation can be part of the “cost of doing business” when you are in the news publication business. That said, this was, in my opinion, easily avoidable. I’m not sure if there was a failure to have full legal review done before the publication was published, or if someone didn’t take the demand letter from Boone’s attorney seriously … but Newsweek, with the limited information we’re presented with anyway, appears to have had two opportunities to avoid this litigation and they didn’t take advantage of either. The first would have been to train reporting and editing staff to not use unrelated images, especially of identifiable people, in news reporting efforts. This should be a no-brainer, but given how often I see that happen in news publications, I’m not surprised. The second would have been to acknowledge the mistake and simply change out the picture to something more appropriate … you know, like an image of the actual officer being accused in the article … when they received notice that there was an issue. Doubling down on something like this seems like an unnecessary risk … that has now resulted in costly litigation. Maybe Newsweek has a huge litigation budget … but even then, you’d think that they’d want to use it a little more wisely.

Citation: Boone v. Newsweek, LLC, Case No. 22-1601, E.D. Pa, Feb. 27, 2023)

DISCLAIMER: This is for general information purposes only. This should not be relied upon as formal legal advice. If you have a legal matter that you are concerned with, you should seek out an attorney in your jurisdiction who may be able to advise you of your rights and options.

NY District Court Swings a Bat at “The Hateful Conduct Law” – Volokh v. James

This February14th (2023), Valentine’s Day, the NY Federal District Court showed no love for New York’s Hateful Conduct Law when it granted a preliminary injunction to halt it. So this is, to me, an exceptionally fun case because it includes not only the First Amendment (to the United States Constitution) but also Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230. I’m also intrigued because renowned Eugene Volokh, Locals Technology, Inc., and Rumble Canada, Inc. are the Plaintiffs. If Professor Volokh is involved, it’s likely to be an interesting argument. The information about the case below has been pulled from the Court Opinion and various linked websites.

Plaintiffs: Eugene Volokh, Locals Technology, Inc., and Rumble Canada, Inc.

Defendant: Letitia James, in her official capacity as New York Attorney General

Case No.: 22-cv-10195 (ALC)

The Honorable Andrew L. Carter, Jr. started the opinion with the following powerful quote:

 “Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”

Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) 

Before we get into what happened, it’s worth taking a moment to explain who the Plaintiffs in the case are. Eugene Volokh (“Volokh”) is a renowned First Amendment law professor at UCLA. In addition, Volokh is the co-owner and operator of the popular legal blog known as the Volokh Conspiracy. Rumble, operates a website similar to YouTube which allows third-party independent creators to upload and share video content. Rumble sets itself apart from other similar platforms because it has a “free speech purpose” and it’s “mission [is] ‘to protect a free and open internet’ and to ‘create technologies that are immune to cancel culture.” Locals Technology, Inc. (“Locals”) is a subsidiary of Rumble and also operates a website that allows third party-content to be shared among paid, and unpaid, subscribers. Similar to Rumble, Locals also reports having a “pro-fee speech purpose” and a “mission of being ‘committed to fostering a community that is safe, respectful, and dedicated to the free exchange of ideas.” Suffice it to say, the Plaintiffs are no stranger to the First Amendment or Section 230. So how did these parties become Plaintiffs? New York tried to pass a well intentioned, but arguably unconstitutional, law that could very well negatively impact them.

On May 14th last year, 2022, some random racist nut job used Twitch (a social media site) to livestream himself carrying out a mass shooting on shoppers at a grocery store in Buffalo, New York. This disgusting act of violence left 10 people dead and three people wounded. As with most atrocities, and with what I call the “train wreck effect”, this video went viral on various other social media platforms. In response to the atrocity New York’s Governor Kathy Hochul kicked the matter over to the Attorney General’s Office for investigation with an apparent instruction to focus on “the specific online platforms that were used to broadcast and amplify the acts and intentions of the mass shooting” and directed the Attorney General’s Office to “investigate various online platforms for ‘civil or criminal liability for their role in promoting, facilitating, or providing a platform to plan or promote violence.” Apparently the Governor hasn’t heard about Section 230, but I’ll get to that in a minute. After investigation, the Attorney General’s Office released a report, and later a press release, that stated “[o]nline platforms should be held accountable for allowing hateful and dangerous content to spread on their platforms” because an alleged “lack of oversight, transparency, and accountability of these platforms allows hateful and extremist views to proliferate online.” This is where one, having any knowledge about this area of law, should insert the facepalm emoji. If you aren’t familiar with this area of law, this will help explain (a little – we’re trying to keep this from being a dissertation).

Now no reasonable person will disagree that this event was tragic and disgusting. Humans are weird beings and for whatever reason (though I suspect a deep dive into psychology would provide some insight), we cannot look away from a train wreck. We’re drawn to it like a moth to a flame. Just look at any news organization and what is shared. You can’t tell me that’s not filled with “train wreck” information. Don Henley said it best in his lyrics in the 1982 song Dirty Laundry, talking about the news: “she can tell you about the plane crash with a gleam in her eye” … “it’s interesting when people die, give us dirty laundry”. A Google search for the song lyrics will give you full context if you’re not a Don Henley fan … but even 40 plus years later, this is still a truth.

In effort to combat the perceived harms from the atrocity that went viral, New York, on December 3, 2022 enacted The Hateful Conduct Law, entitled “Social media networks; hateful conduct prohibited.” What in the world does that mean? Well, the law applies to “social medial networks” and defined “hateful conduct” as: “[T]he use of a social media network to vilify, humiliate, incite violence against a group or a class of persons on the basis of race, color, religion, ethnicity, national origin, disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 394-ccc(1)(a). Okay, but still ..

In explaining The Hateful Conduct Law, and as the Court’s opinion (with citations omitted) explains:

[T]he Hateful Conduct Law requires that social media networks create a complaint mechanism for three types of “conduct”: (1) conduct that vilifies; (2) conduct that humiliates; and (3) conduct that incites violence. This “conduct” falls within the law’s definition if it is aimed at an individual or group based on their “race”, “color”, “religion”, “ethnicity”, “national origin”, “disability”, “sex”, “sexual” orientation”, “gender identity” or “gender expression”.

The Hateful Conduct Law has two main requirements: (1) a mechanism for social media users to file complaints about instances of “hateful conduct” and (2) disclosure of the social media network’s policy for how it will respond to any such complaints. First, the law requires a social media network to “provide and maintain a clear and easily accessible mechanism for individual users to report incidents of hateful conduct.” This mechanism must “be clearly accessible to users of such network and easily accessed from both a social media networks’ application and website. . . .” and must “allow the social media network to provide a direct response to any individual reporting hateful conduct informing them of how the matter is being handled.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 394-ccc(2).

Second, a social media network must “have a clear and concise policy readily available and accessible on their website and application. . . ” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 394-ccc(3). This policy must “include how such social media network will respond and address the reports of incidents of hateful conduct on their platform.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 394-ccc(3).

The law also empowers the Attorney General to investigate violations of the law and provides for civil penalties for social media networks which “knowingly fail to comply” with the requirements. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 394-ccc(5).

Naturally this raised a lot of questions. How far reaching is this law? Who and what counts as a “social media network”? What persons or entities would be impacted? Who decides what is “hateful conduct”? Does the government have the authority to try and regulate speech in this way?

Two days before the law was to go into effect, on December 1, 2022, the instant action was commenced by the Plaintiffs alleging both facially, and as-applied, challenges to The Hateful Conduct Law. Plaintiffs argued that the law “violates the First Amendment because it: (1) is a content viewpoint-based regulation of speech; (2) is overbroad; and (3) is void for vagueness. Plaintiffs also alleged that the law is preempted by” Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

For the full discussion and analysis on the First Amendment arguments, it’s best to review the full opinion, however, the Court’s opinion opened with the following summary of its position (about the First Amendment as applied to the law):

“With the well-intentioned goal of providing the public with clear policies and mechanisms to facilitate reporting hate speech on social media, the New York State legislature enacted N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 394-ccc (“the Hateful Conduct Law” or “the law”). Yet, the First Amendment protects from state regulation speech that may be deemed “hateful” and generally disfavors regulation of speech based on its content unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The Hateful Conduct Law both compels social media networks to speak about the contours of hate speech and chills the constitutionally protected speech of social media users, without articulating a compelling governmental interest or ensuring that the law is narrowly tailored to that goal.”

With respect to the preemption argument made by Plaintiffs, that is that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act preempts the law because it imposes liability on websites by treating them as publishers. As the Court outlines (some citations to cases omitted):

The Communications Decency Act provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The Act has an express preemption provision which states that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).

As compared to the section of the Opinion regarding the First Amendment, the Court gives very little analysis on the Section 230 preemption claim beyond making the following statements:

“A plain reading of the Hateful Conduct Law shows that Plaintiffs’ argument is without merit. The law imposes liability on social media networks for failing to provide a mechanism for users to complain of “hateful conduct” and for failure to disclose their policy on how they will respond to complaints. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 394-ccc(5). The law does not impose liability on social media networks for failing to respond to an incident of “hateful conduct”, nor does it impose liability on the network for its users own “hateful conduct”. The law does not even require that social media networks remove instances of “hateful conduct” from their websites. Therefore, the Hateful Conduct Law does not impose liability on Plaintiffs as publishers in contravention of the Communications Decency Act.” (emphasis added)

Hold up sparkles. So the Court recognizes the fact that platforms cannot be held liable (in these instances anyway) for third-party content, no matter how ugly that content might be, but yet wants to force (punish in my opinion) a platform by forcing them to spend big money on development to create all these content reporting mechanisms, and set transparency policies, for content that they actually have no legal requirement to remove? How does this law make sense in the first place? What is the point (besides trying to trap them into having a policy that if they don’t follow could give rise to an action for unfair or deceptive advertising)? This doesn’t encourage moderation. In fact, I’d argue that it does the opposite and encourages a website to say “we don’t do anything about speech that someone claims to be harmful because we don’t want liability for failing to do so if we miss something.” In my mind, this is a punishment, based upon third-party content. You don’t need a “reporting mechanism” for content that people aren’t likely to find offensive (like cute cat videos). To this end, I can see why Plaintiffs raised a Section 230 preemption argument … because if you drill it down, the law is still trying to force websites to take an action to deal with undesirable third-party content (and then punish them if they don’t follow whatever their policy is). In my view, it’s an attempt to do an end run around Section 230. The root issue is still undesirable third-party content. Consequently, I’m not sure I agree with the Court’s position here. I don’t think the court drilled down enough to the root of the issue.

Either way, the Court did, as explained in the beginning, grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (based upon the First Amendment arguments) which, at current, prohibits New York from trying to enforce the law.

Citation: Volokh v. James, Case No. 22-cv-10195 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 14, 2023)

DISCLOSURE: This is not mean to be legal advice nor should it be relied upon as such.

Pro Se’s kitchen sink approach results in a loss – Lloyd v. Facebook

The “kitchen sink approach” isn’t an uncommon complaint claim strategy when it comes to filing lawsuits against platforms. Notwithstanding decades of precedent clearly indicating that such efforts are doomed to fail, plaintiffs still give it the ole’ college try. Ironically, and while this makes more sense with pro se plaintiffs because they don’t have the same legal training and understanding of how to research case law, pro se plaintiffs aren’t the only ones who try it … no matter how many times they lose. Indeed, even some lawyers like to get paid to make losing arguments. [Insert the hands up shrug emoji here].

Plaintiff: Susan Lloyd

Defendants: Facebook, Inc.; Meta Platforms, Inc.; Mark Zuckerberg (collectively, “Defendants”)

In this instance Plaintiff is a resident of Pennsylvania who suffers from “severe vision issues”. As such, she qualified as “disabled” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Ms. Lloyd, like approximately 266 million other Americans, uses the Facebook social media platform, which as my readers likely know, is connected to, among other things, third-party advertisements.

While the full case history isn’t recited in the Court’s short opinion, it’s worth while to point out (it appears anyway with the limited record before me at this time) that the Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to amend her complaint multiple times as the Court cites to the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). According to the Court Order, the TAC alleged claims violations of:

Plaintiff alleged problems with the platform – suggesting it inaccessible to disabled individuals with no arms or problems with vision (and itemized a laundry list of issues that I won’t cite here … but suffice it to say that there was a complaint about the font size not being able to be made larger). [SIDE NOTE: For those that are unaware, website accessibility is a thing, and plaintiffs can, and will, try to hold website operators (of all types, not just big ones like Facebook) accountable if they deem there to be an accessibility issue. If you want to learn a little more, you can read information that is put out on the Beebe Law website regarding ADA Website Compliance.]

Plaintiff alleged that the advertisements on Facebook were tracking her without her permission … except that users agree to Facebook’s Terms of Service (which presumably allow for that since the court brought it up). I’m not sure at what point people will realize that if you are using something for free, you ARE the product. Indeed, there are many new privacy laws being put into place throughout various states (e.g., California, Colorado, Utah, Virginia and Connecticut) but chances are, especially with large multi-national platforms, they are on top of the rules and are ensuring their compliance. If you aren’t checking your privacy settings, or blocking tracking pixels, etc., at some point that’s going to be on you. Technology gives folks ways to opt out – if you can locate it. I realize that sometimes these things can be hard to find – but often a search on Google will land you results – or just ask any late teen early 20s person. They seem to have a solid command on stuff like this these days.

Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants allowed “over 500 people to harass and bully Plaintiff on Facebook.” The alleged allegations of threats by the other users are rather disturbing and won’t be repeated here (though you can review the case for the quotes). However, Plaintiff stated that each time that she reported the harassment she, and others, were told that it didn’t violate community standards. There is more to the story where things have allegedly escalated off-line. The situation complained about, if true, is quite unsettling … and anyone with decency would be sympathetic to Plaintiff’s concerns.

[SIDE NOTE: Not to suggest that I’m suggesting what happened, if true, wasn’t something that should be looked at and addressed for the future. I’m well aware that Facebook (along with other social media) have imperfect systems. Things that shouldn’t be blocked are blocked. for example, I’ve seen images of positive quotes and peanut butter cookies be blocked or covered from initial viewing as “sensitive”. On the other hand, I’ve also seen things that (subjectively speaking but as someone who spent nearly a decade handling content moderation escalations) should be blocked, that aren’t. Like clearly spammy or scammer accounts. We all know them when we see them yet they remain even after reporting them. I’ve been frustrated by the system myself … and know well both sides of that argument. Nevertheless, if one was to take into account the sheer volume of posts and things that come in you’d realize that it’s a modern miracle that they have any system for trying to deal with such issues at all. Content moderation at scale is incredibly difficult.]

Notwithstanding the arguments offered, the court was quick to procedurally dismiss all but the breach of contract claim because the claims were already dismissed prior (Plaintiff apparently re-plead the same causes of action). More specifically, the court dismissed the ADA and Rehabilitation claim because (at least under the 9th Cir.) Facebook is not a place of public accommodation under Federal Law. [SIDE NOTE: there is a pretty deep split in the circuits on this point – so this isn’t necessarily a “get out of jail free” card if one is a website operator – especially if one may be availing themselves to the jurisdiction of another circuit that wouldn’t be so favorable. Again, if you’re curious about ADA Website Compliance, check out the Beebe Law website]. Similarly, Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim failed because the act doesn’t apply to digital-only website such as Facebook. Plaintiff’s fraud and intentional misrepresentation claims failed because there wasn’t really any proof that Facebook intended to defraud Plaintiff and only the Terms of Service were talked about. So naturally, if you can’t back up the claims, it ends up being a wasted argument. Maybe not so clear for Pro Se litigants, but this should be pretty clear to lawyers (still doesn’t keep them from trying). Plaintiff’s claims for invasion of privacy, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress failed because they are barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230. Again, this is another one of those situations where decades of precedent contrary to a plaintiff’s position isn’t a deterrent from trying to advance such claims anyway. Lastly, the claims against Zuckerberg were dismissed because Plaintiff didn’t allege that he was personally involved or directed the challenged acts (i.e., he isn’t an “alter ego”).

This left the breach of contract claim. Defendants in this case argued that Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract should be dismissed because the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the claim because she cannot meet the amount in controversy. As the Court explains, “28 U.S.C. §1332 grants federal courts’ original jurisdiction over civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the parties are citizens of different states.” Indeed, they are parties are from different states, however, that requirement that the amount in controversy is to exceed $75,000 is where Plaintiff met an impossible hurdle. As discussed prior, users of Facebook all agree to Facebook’s Terms of Service. Here, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract is based on conduct of third-party users and Facebook’s Terms of Service disclaim all liability for third-party conduct. Further, the TOS also provide, “aggregate liability arising out of.. .the [TOS] will not exceed the greater of $100 or the amount Plaintiff has paid Meta in the past twelve months.” Facebook having been around the block a time or two with litigation have definitely refined their TOS over the years to make it nearly impenetrable. I mean, never say never, BUT…good luck. Lastly, the TOS precludes damages for “lost profits, revenues, information, or data, or consequential, special indirect, exemplary, punitive, or incidental damages.” Based upon all of these issues, there is no legal way that Plaintiff could meet the required amount in controversy of $75,000. The Court dismissed the final remaining claim, breach of contract, without leave to amend, although the court did add in “[t]he Court expresses no opinion on whether Plaintiff may pursue her contract claim in state court.” One might construe that as a sympathetic signal to the Plaintiff (or other future Plaintiffs)…

There are a few takeaways from this case, in my opinion:

  1. Throwing garden variety kitchen sink claims at platforms, especially ones the size of Facebook, is likely to be a waste of ink on paper on top of the time it takes to even put the ink on the paper in the first place. If you have concerns about issues with a platform, engage the services of an Internet lawyer in your area that understands all of these things.
  2. Properly drafted, and accepted, Terms of Service for your website can be a huge shield from liability. This is why copying and pasting from some random whatever site or using a “one-size-fits-all” free form from one of those “do-it-yourself” sites is acting penny wise and pound foolish. Just hire a darn Internet lawyer to help you if you’re operating a business website. It can save you money and headache in the long run – and investment into the future of your company if you will.
  3. Website Accessibility, and related claims, is a thing! You don’t hear a lot about it because the matters don’t typically make it to court. Many of these cases settle based upon demand letters for thousands of dollars and costly remediation work … so don’t think that it can’t happen to you (if you’re operating a website for your business).

Citation: Lloyd v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. 21-cv-10075-EMC (N.D. Cal, Feb. 7, 2023)

DISCLAIMER: This is for general information only. This is not legal advice nor should it be relied upon as such. If you have concerns regarding your own specific situation, be sure to reach out to an attorney in your jurisdiction who may be able to advise you of your rights.

GoDaddy not liable for third-party snagging prior owned domain – Rigsby v. GoDaddy Inc.

This case should present as a cautionary tale of why you want to ensure you’ve got your auto-renewals on, and you’re ensuring the renewal works, for your website domains if you plan on using them long term for any purpose. Failing to renew timely (or ensuring there is actual renewal) can have unintended frustrating consequences.

Plaintiffs-Appellants: Scott Rigsby and Scott Rigsby Foundation, Inc. (together “Rigsby”).

Defendants-Appellees: GoDaddy, Inc., GoDaddy.com, LLC, and GoDaddy Operating Company, LLC and Desert Newco, LLC (together “GoDaddy”).

Scott Rigsby is a physically challenged athlete and motivational speaker who started the Scott Rigsby Foundation. In 2007, in connection with the foundation he registered the domain name “scottrigsbyfoundation.org” with GoDaddy.com. Unfortunately, and allegedly as a result of a glitch in GoDaddy’s billing system, Rigsby failed to pay the annual renewal fee in 2018. In these instances, typically the domain will then be free to purchase by anyone and this is exactly what happened – a third-party registered the then-available domain name and turned it into a gambling information site. Naturally this is a very frustrating situation for Rigsby.

Rigsby then decided to sue GoDaddy for violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (which for my non-legal industry readers is the primary federal trademark statute in the United States) and various state laws and sought declaratory and injunctive relief including return of the domain name.

This legal strategy is most curious to me because they didn’t name the third-party that actually purchased the domain and actually made use of it. For those that are unaware, “use in commerce” by the would be trademark infringer is a requirement of the Lanham Act and it seems like a pretty long leap to suggest that GoDaddy was the party in this situation that made use of subject domain.

Rigsby also faced another hurdle, that is, GoDaddy has immunity under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (“ACPA”). The ACPA limits the secondary liability of domain name registrars and registries for the act of registering a domain name. Rigsby would be hard pressed to show that GoDaddy registered, used, or trafficked in his domain name with a bad faith intent to profit. Similarly, Rigsby would also be hard pressed to show that GoDaddy’s alleged wrongful conduct surpassed mere registration activity.

Lastly, Rigsby faced a hurdle when it comes to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230. I’ve written about Section 230 may times in my blogs, but in general Section 230 provides immunity to websites/platforms from claims stemming from the content created by third-parties. To be sure, there are some exceptions, including intellectual property law claims. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) there wasn’t an act done by GoDaddy that would fairly sit square within the Lanham Act such that they would have liability. So this doesn’t apply. Additionally, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) preempts state law claims. Put another way, with a few exceptions, a platform will also avoid liability from various state law claims. As such, Section 230 would shield GoDaddy from liability for Rigsby’s state-law claims for invasion of privacy, publicity, trade libel, libel, and violations of Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act. These are garden variety tort law claims that plaintiff’s will typically assert in these kinds of instances, however, plaintiffs have to be careful that they are directed at the right party … and it’s fairly rare that a platform is going to be the right party in these situations.

The District of Arizona dismissed all of the claims against GoDaddy and Rigsby then appealed the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. While sympathetic to the plight of Rigsby, the court correctly concluded, on February 3, 2023, that Rigsby was barking up the wrong tree in terms of who they named as a defendant and appropriately dismissed the claims against GoDaddy.

To read the court’s full opinion which goes into greater detail about the facts of this case, click on the citation below.

Citation: Rigsby v. GoDaddy, Inc., Case No. 21016182 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2023)

DISCLAIMER: This is for general information only. None of this is meant to be legal advice nor should it be relied upon as such.

Section 230 doesn’t protect against a UGC platform’s own unlawful conduct – Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Roomster Corp

This seems like a no-brainer to anyone who understands Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act but for some reason it still hasn’t stopped defendants from making the tried and failed argument that Section 230 protects a platform from their own unlawful conduct.

Plaintiffs: Federal Trade Commission, State of California, State of Colorado, State of Florida, State of Illinois, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and State of New York

Defendants: Roomster Corporation, John Shriber, indivudally and officer of Roomster, and Roman Zaks, individually and as an officer of Roomster.

Roomster (roomster.com) is an internet-based (desktop and mobile app) room and roommate finder platform that purports to be an intermediary (i.e., the middle man) between individuals who are seeking rentals, sublets, and roommates. For anyone that has been around for a minute in this industry, you might be feeling like we’ve got a little bit of a Roommates.com legal situation going on here but it’s different. Roomster, like may platforms that allows third-party content also known as User Generated Content (“UGC”) platforms, does not verify listings or ensure that the listings are real or authentic and has allegedly allowed postings to go up where the address of the listing was a U.S. Post Office. Now this might seem out of the ordinary to an every day person reading this, but I can assure you, it’s nearly impossible for any UGC platform to police every listing, especially if they are a small company and have any reasonable volume of traffic and it would become increasingly hard to try and moderate as they grow. That’s just the truth of operating a UGC platform.

Notwithstanding these fake posting issues, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have falsely represented that properties listed on the Roomster platform are real, available, and verified. [OUCH!] They further allege that Defendants have created or purchased thousands of fake positive reviews to support these representations and placed fake rental listings on the Internet to drive traffic to their platform. [DOUBLE OUCH!] If true, Roomster may be in for a ride.

The FTC has alleged that Defendants’ acts or practices violate Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (which in layman terms is the federal law against unfair methods of competition) and the states have alleged the various state versions of deceptive acts and practices. At this point, based on the alleged facts, it seems about right to me.

Roomster filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for Plaintiffs alleged failure to state a claim for various reasons that I won’t discuss, but you can read about in the case, but also argued that “even if Plaintiffs may bring their claims, Defendants cannot be held liable for injuries stemming from user-generated listings and reviews because … they are interactive computer service providers and so are immune from liability for inaccuracies in user-supplied content, pursuant to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230.” Where is the facepalm emoji when you need it? Frankly, that’s a “hail-mary” and total waste of an argument … because Section 230 does not immunize a defendant from liability from its own unlawful conduct. Indeed, a platform can be held liable for for offensive content on its service or system if it contributes to the development of what makes the content unlawful. This is also true where a platform has engaged in deceptive practices, or has had direct participation in a deceptive scheme. Fortunately, like many courts before it, the court in this case saw through the crap and rightfully denied the Motion to Dismiss on this (and other points).

I smell a settlement in the air, but only time will tell.

Case Citation: Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Roomster Corp., Case No. 22 Civ 7389 (S.D. N.Y., Feb. 1, 2023)

DISCLAIMER: This is for general information only. None of this is meant to be legal advice nor should it be relied upon as such.

Anti-SLAPP Laws Without Mandatory Award of Fees and Costs is a Hinderance to the Access to Justice and Chills Free Speech

Arizona recently passed a new anti-SLAPP law, 2022 Ariz. HB 2722 (it’s not in effect yet and won’t be for a few months at least) and while a colleague of mine and are are working on a more comprehensive discussion about anti-SLAPP and this new law specifically (which I will link here once done and/or you can always follow me here or on various social media to get the latest) as I was writing the initial draft of that article this week I became more and more frustrated. Anti-SLAPP laws without a mandatory award of attorneys fees and costs to the prevailing party of such motion is a hindrance to the access to justice for real victims of SLAPP suits and chills free speech. How? Let me elaborate.

I should preface this with the fact that I spent the better part of a decade working as in-house counsel of an interactive online forum and I’ve pretty much seen it all when it comes to true victims sharing their honest stories (and being threatened because if it) and bad actors using the Internet as a source of revenge (where people are desperate to make the harassment stop and to remove untruthful, hurtful, information from the platform). As such, my opinion is through a lens of having heard countless stories from all sides.

Generally speaking (obviously there are always outliers) those who lawfully criticize wrongdoers, especially online, do so because they don’t have the means to file suit regarding the experience that led to the criticism. Complaining online is their remedy. If those being criticized are powerful and/or wealthy, it’s really easy to say “Take that content down or I’ll sue you.” Many Americans are living paycheck to paycheck, but even if they are comfortably above that, they often cannot afford to be sued. Just look at how long it took to get through the Depp/Heard case. Granted, that was where two parties were heavily pushing back on who was right … but this is not unlike many civil cases. In fact, the behaviors exhibited in that court room and on display for the watching world to see is not all that unusual for litigating parties. The only difference there is that it was televised and people care enough about celebrity dirt to watch the case unfold on live television/online streaming.

But if you aren’t a celebrity or wealthy individual … if you cannot afford to fight back through expensive lawyers, even if you’re in the right … what do you do? Chances are you begrudgingly remove the content to save your own pocket book, or worse, lose a legal action and end up with a, albeit by default, judgment against you if you cannot, for whatever reason (and there are many reasons) don’t appear in a case. Ahh, yes … the threat of a SLAPP suit is indeed a huge and powerful sword.

But what happens if you cannot remove the content because the website’s terms of service prohibit it, or such posting has been scraped and put up elsewhere such that you do not have control over it? Oh yes, this happens all the time online. People don’t read Terms of Service and unfortunately, copy cat websites scrape content that isn’t theirs. In this instance, chances are, you will get sued anyway. Why? Because it’s worth it for the wealthy/powerful to try to get a court order to remove the content from the internet and they can’t do that without a suit. After all, many platforms will honor court orders for content removal even if they are obtained by default.

And in a lot of ways, this makes sense. Especially when bad actors/defamers hide behind anonymous accounts and/or are in foreign countries that make pursuing the perpetrator cost prohibitive or near impossible for real victims. Real victims need relief and this is one such pathway to remedy. On the other hand, for the truth tellers, it can be hard to stand up to wealthy/powerful bad actors when faced with a lawsuit. Those who speak up honestly can get the short end of the stick. If a suit is filed, and they can’t afford to defend against it, are they to be victimized yet again by default? I know it happens. I’ve seen it happen. Let me give you an example.

Imagine with me for a moment that you are a business owner of a new start-up company called Cool Business, LLC operating in Arizona, and you want to engage the services of a advertising company. Your friend, Tim, gives you the name of Great Advertising Co. based out of New York. A New York advertising company sounds fancy and you think they will probably do a far better job than anyone here in little Arizona so you reach out to them. The conversation goes great, they send you a basic contract to sign for the work to be done for Cool Business, LLC and require a $6,000.00 deposit so they can get started on the work and another $4,000.00 in 90 days for a total contract of $10,000.00 over three months. You skim the agreement, gloss over the headings of the boilerplate terms (because they’re all the same, right?), sign it and send them the $6,000.00. Everything goes great at first, but months into the relationship, and dozens of calls later, you realize that Great Advertising Co. is flakey. They aren’t delivering the services on time, there is always an excuse for why the work isn’t done, but when the 90 days hits, they still ask for their additional $4,000.00 pursuant to the contract. The business relationship at this point has soured. Great Advertising Co. demands their additional $4,000.00 under the contract, which you refuse to pay, and you instead demand a refund of your $6,000.00. Great Advertising Co. refuses to refund you the $6,000.00. Pissed off, you take your story to your favorite business attorney in Arizona and she reviews your contract and advises you that while you may have a breach of contract claim, the terms of your contract say that you agree to litigate any matters stemming from the agreement in a court in New York and that because the contract is with Cool Business, LLC that you’d have to hire a lawyer, in the state of New York, to handle the matter for you because businesses have to be represented by a lawyer in the court that you’d have to file in. Knowing that New York lawyers can be very expensive, you decide it’s not worth the hassle and to cut your losses. Understandably being upset, however, you take to the Internet to tell everyone you know how, truthfully, Great Advertising Co. ripped you off and you explain in detail what happened. You post your reviews to Google, Yelp, Facebook and any other place you can find to help spread the word about these unscrupulous business tactics and you leave it at that. Ten months later you receive a letter from a Great Advertising Co.’s New York lawyer telling you that you need technically still owe the $4,000.00 under the contract and that Great Advertising Co. doesn’t appreciate the negative reviews and demands that you immediately remove them or they will file a lawsuit against you for defamation. You ignore the letter because you know that you have a good breach of contract case and the First Amendment on your side because what you said was 100% the truth and you know, after talking to your favorite defamation attorney a few years back, you know that the truth is a defense to a claim of defamation. A day prior to the one year anniversary of your pissed off customer online posting tirade you are served with a complaint, based out of New York for defamation. You’ve watched the Johnny Depp and Amber Heard defamation trial. You saw how long that case was drug out and you know that you don’t have the funds to pay an attorney to fight for your rights in New York. You didn’t even have the funds to hire a New York attorney to bring a breach of contract case against Great Advertising Co. to try and get your $6,000.00 back. As such, feeling defeated, and without talking to your favorite defamation attorney again, you just ignore the complaint. You figure, what’s the worst that can happen. Great Advertising Co. obtains a default judgment against you individually with an order to take down the content and the judge awards $2,500.00 in damages.

Now, this entire hypothetical, while obviously facts have been changed and such, is based off a true story of what one individual experienced and how these types of situations can go south in a hurry. There are countless similar stories just like this out there. Good folks are victimized not just once, by the initial acts, but twice in some instances like in this hypothetical. But this is where good anti-SLAPP laws come into play.

Anti-SLAPP laws are designed to fight back against those who file lawsuits just to try and silence their critics, but without the promise of attorney fees and costs for the work, victims of little means are hard pressed to find lawyers willing to help (hence the hinderance to access to justice). The sad truth is that most lawyers (like most professions) cannot afford to work for free – being a professional is expensive and it’s not getting any cheaper. When anti-SLAPP laws include such fee provisions, it’s a lot easier for attorneys to consider taking on a SLAPP case, with low or no money down, case because they know they will get paid when they win. This is of course presuming it’s a deep pocket that filed the SLAPP in the first place because the reality is a judgment is only worth one’s ability to collect.

When anti-SLAPP laws fail to include such provisions, there is little deterrent to filing a SLAPP suit. Yes, if the little person being picked on has means, maybe they will think twice but that’s not often the case and the SLAPP filers know, and bank on, the litigation causing financial hardship or stress so that the truth teller will simply give in to the demands to remove the content prior to even answering the complaint, thus chilling truthful speech. It’s a powerful tactic. If it wasn’t, there wouldn’t be so many states with anti-SLAPP laws trying to curb such problems in the first place.

As many legal practitioners are painfully aware, it can be very difficult to get a judge to award attorneys fees and costs absent it being statutorily required. So even if you fight against a SLAPP suit, and win, you could still be out tens of thousands of dollars (or more depending on the case) with no guarantee of recovery. As an attorney, when you have to tell potential clients this, you can see the defeat in people’s faces before you even get going. It’s scary. What average person has tens of thousands of dollars laying around to pay to a lawyer to fight for their First Amendment right to free speech?

Would those odds make you excited about standing up for yourself? I think not. If you knew all this, would you be so willing to share with the public honest information about bad actors and you personal experience? I think not.

And this doesn’t just go for complaining consumers, but also for investigative journalists. If you think a random, but bigger company, going after an unhappy customer who got ripped off is bad and complained about it is bad … imagine what a powerful elite will try to do to an investigative journalist trying to uncover some very serious dirty laundry and expose it to the world?

Bottom line, for any anti-SLAPP law to be a true shield, among other things, it must contain, at minimum, a statutory award of attorney fees and costs.

Disclaimer: This is for general information purposes only and none of this is meant to be legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice.

#firstamendment #defamation #antiSLAPP #legislation #accesstojustice

California Assembly Bill 1678 designed to protect against age discrimination gets tagged by Ninth Circuit on First Amendment grounds: IMDb.com, Inc. v. Becerra

On June 19, 2020 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the content-based restrictions on speech contained within California’s Assembly Bill 1678 was facially unconstitutional because it “does not survive First Amendment scrutiny.”

I feel like if you live outside of glamorous places like California, New York and Florida, you may not be paying attention to laws being pushed by organizations like the Screen Actors Guild aka “SAG,” nevertheless … I try to keep my ear to the ground for cases that involve the First Amendment and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. This case happens to raise both issues, although only the First Amendment matter is addressed here.

For those that may be unfamiliar, IBDb.com is an Internet Movie Database which provides a free public website that includes information about movies, television shows, and video games. It also contains information information on actors and crew members in the industry which may contain the subject’s age or date of birth. This is an incredibly popular site, the court opinion noting that as of January of 2017 “it ranked 54th most visited website in the world.” The information on the site is generated by users (just like you and I) but IMDb does employ a “Database Content Team tasked with reviewing the community’s additions and revisions for accuracy.”

Outside of the “free” user generated section, IMDb also introduced, back in 2002, a subscription-based service called “IMDbPro” for the industry professionals (actors/crew and recruiters) to essentially act as a LinkedIn but for Hollywood – providing space for professionals to upload resume type information, headshots, etc. and casting agents could search the database for talent.

Back in 2016 apparently SAG pushed for regulation in California (which was enacted as Assembly Bill 1687) that arguably targeted IMDb, in effort to curtail alleged age discrimination in the entertainment industry. No doubt a legitimate concern (as it is in many industries) however, often good intentions result in bad law.

AB 1687 was signed into law, codified at Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83.5 and included the following provision:

A commercial online entertainment employment service provider that enters into a contractual agreement to provide employment services to an individual for a subscription payment shall not, upon request by the subscriber, do either of the following: (1) [p]ublish or make public the subscriber’s date of birth or age information in an online profile of the subscriber [or] (2) [s]hare the subscriber’s date of birth or age information with any Internet Web sites for the purpose of publication.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83.5(b)(1)-(2)

The statute also provides, in pertinent part:

A commercial online entertainment employment service provider subject to subdivision (b) shall, within five days, remove from public view in an online profile of the subscriber the subscriber’s date of birth and age information on any companion Internet Web sites under its control upon specific request by the subscriber naming the Internet Web sites.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83.5(c)

The practical affect of these provisions is that it requires that subscribers of IMDbPro, be able to request that IMDb, and that IMDb, upon such request, remove the subscriber’s age or date of birth from the subscriber’s profile (which I would think they could do on their own to the extent they have control over such profile data) AND, more problematically, anywhere else on their website where such information exists regardless of who created that content. This is now extending to content the IMDbPro subscribers may not have control over as it may have been generated by third-party users of the site.

The Court opinion explained that “[b]efore AB 1687 took effect, IMDb filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C § 1983 in the Northern District of California to prevent its enforcement. IMDb alleged that AB 1687 violated both the First Amendment and Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as well as the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).” While there was much back and forth between the parties, the crux of the debate, and crucial for the appeal was the debate over the language prohibiting IMDb’s ability to publish the age of information without regard to the source of the information.

When considering the statutory language restricting what could be posted the Court of Appeals concluded:

  • AB 1687 implemented content-based restriction on speech (i.e., dissemination of date of birth or age) that is subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
  • AB 1687 did not present a situation where reduced protection would apply (e.g., where the speech at issue is balanced against a social interest in order and morality).
    • IMDb’s content did not constitute Commercial Speech.
    • IMDb’s content did not facilitate illegal conduct.
    • IMDb’s content did not implicate privacy concerns.
  • AB 1687 does not survive strict scrutiny because it was not the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal and it wasn’t narrowly tailored.

In conclusion the Court articulated a position that I wholly agree with: “Unlawful age discrimination has no place in the entertainment industry, or any other industry. But not all statutory means of ending such discrimination are constitutional.”

Citation: IMDb.com, Inc. v. Becerra, Case Nos. 18-15463, 18-15469 (9th Cir. 2020)

Disclaimer: This is for general information purposes only and none of this is meant to be legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice.

Facebook’s Terms of Service set jurisdiction for litigation – We Are the People, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.

A common mistake, and arguably a waste of time, is to attempt to bring a breach of contract litigation in a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction that the contract states. Years ago I wrote an article about the importance of boilerplate terms. One of the very first points I discuss is choice of law/choice of forum clauses.

Most people who are entering into a contract read the contract before they sign their name. Curiously, this doesn’t seem to translate when people are signing up for a website or app. I actually wrote about this too, warning people that they are responsible for their own actions when it comes to website Terms of Service and that they should read them before they sign up. Alas, we’re all human and the only real time people tend to look at the Terms of Service (i.e., the use contract) is when the poo has hit the fan. Even then, the first thing most people look at (or should look at if they are considering litigation) is the choice of law provisions.

In this instance, Plaintiff’s brought a lawsuit against Facebook in the Southern District of New York alleging that Facebook’s removal of content from Facebook’s pages violated Facebook’s “contractual and quasi-contractual obligations to keep Plaintiffs’ content posted indefinitely.” Anyone who has ever used Facebook would likely realize that the “contract” being discussed would stem from their Terms of Service. Facebook filed a motion to dismiss based upon Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act or, alternatively, to transfer venue.

Why would Facebook want to transfer venue? Because arguably California has better law for them. California has a strong anti-SLAPP law codified at Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425.16 (which applies to many cases that Facebook is likely to be named in) and many Section 230 cases have been ruled upon favorably to platforms. As such, Facebook’s Terms of Service contains a forum selection clause that requires any disputes over the contract be heard by a court in California; more specifically, exclusively in the Northern District of California (or a state court located in San Mateo County).

As I see it, these Plaintiffs either didn’t bother to read that part of the Terms of Service or they wanted to roll the dice and see if Facebook wouldn’t notice (Pro-tip: fat chance of that working). Regardless of the rationale, on June 3, 2020 the court quickly sided with Facebook ruling that the Terms of Service forum selection clause was “plainly mandatory” absent some showing that such clause was unenforceable (which Plaintiffs failed to do and, according to the Court, could not do in this particular circumstance (given Defendants’ memorandum of law) and Facebook’s Motion to Transfer was granted.

Citation: We Are the People, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. 19-CV-8871 (JMF) (S.D. N.Y. 2020)

Disclaimer: This is for general information purposes only and none of this is meant to be legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice.

It’s hard to find caselaw to support your claims when you have none – Wilson v. Twitter

When the court’s opinion is barely over a page when printed, it’s a good sign that the underlying case had little to no merit.

This was a pro se lawsuit, filed against Twitter, because Twitter suspended at least three of Plaintiff’s accounts which were used to “insult gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people for violating the company’s terms of service, specifically its rule against hateful conduct.”

Plaintiff sued Twitter alleging that “[Twitter] suspended his accounts based on his heterosexual and Christian expressions” in violation of the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and for alleged “legal abuse.”

The court was quick to deny all of the claims explaining that:

  1. Plaintiff had no First Amendment claim against Twitter because Twitter was not a state actor; having to painfully explain that just because Twitter was a publicly traded company it doesn’t transform Twitter into a state actor.
  2. Plaintiff had no claim under § 1981 because he didn’t allege racial discrimination.
  3. Plaintiff’s Civil Rights claim failed because: (1) under Title II, only injunctive relief is available (not damages like Plaintiff wanted); (2) Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act bars his claim; and (3) because Title II does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex or sexual orientation (an no facts were asserted to support this claim).
  4. Plaintiff failed to allege any conduct by Twitter that cold plausibly amount to legal abuse.

The court noted that Plaintiff “expresses his difficulty in finding case law to support his claims.” Well, I guess it would be hard to find caselaw to support claims when you have no valid ones.

Citation: Wilson v. Twitter, Civil Action No. 3:20-0054 (S.D. W.Va. 2020)

Disclaimer: This is for general information purposes only and none of this is meant to be legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice.